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Capie: The Right to Self-Representation

FOOLS RUSH IN WHERE LAWYERS WOULD BETTER
TREAD: THE RIGHT TO SELF-REPRESENTATION AND
RELATED STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
The People of the State of New York v. Alias Stone1
(decided February 13, 2014)

I.

INTRODUCTION

An old proverb states that “every man who is his own lawyer,
has a fool for a client.”2 Despite these words of wisdom, the Supreme Court of the United States “bestow[ed] a constitutional right
on one to make a fool of himself” in Faretta v. California3 when it
identified the right to self-representation implicit in the Sixth
Amendment.4
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”5 A criminal
defendant’s ability to waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
and proceed pro se was first recognized in Faretta, which has since
precipitated numerous concerns regarding the competing interests of
a defendant’s right to counsel versus his freedom to waive that same
right and act as his own counsel. Presumably, the average defendant
1

6 N.E.3d 572 (N.Y. 2014).
Often incorrectly attributed to President Abraham Lincoln, this quote was first published
in an 1825 collection of “witty quotes,” and it appears in the following context. HENRY
KETT, THE FLOWERS OF WIT 115 (Hartford, Oliver D. Cooke & Co. 1825). A layperson
mentioned to a lawyer that a particular book of medicine qualified anyone to be his own
physician. Id. The lawyer responded, “How far that may be the case . . . , I will not presume
to determine; but I may be allowed to speak decidedly as to my own profession; and so I hesitate not to pronounce, that every man who is his own lawyer, has a fool for a client.” Id.
3
422 U.S. 806 (1975).
4
Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
5
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2
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is unlikely to provide himself with as effective a defense as an experienced attorney, and disallowing self-representation would further
the interest of providing a fair trial.6 At the same time, a defendant
should have the freedom to make his own choices, and it likewise
seems unfair to force an attorney upon him against his will.7 Justice
Blackmun foresaw serious problems with the right to selfrepresentation in his dissent to the very same decision that established
the right, stating that “[many of the] procedural problems spawned by
[the Faretta decision], such as the standards of waiver and the treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant
who elects to exercise his right to self-representation.”8 The struggle
between these interests has resulted in courts placing limitations on
self-representation in order to balance all the constitutional concerns
at stake. Still, many of these boundaries remain unclear, and it appears that Justice Blackmun’s premonitory words have become a reality.
This note will examine a recent case before the New York
Court of Appeals, People v. Stone,9 which considered the issue of
whether a trial court was constitutionally required to sua sponte assess a defendant’s mental capacity when he requested to represent
himself. The Court of Appeals characterized Stone as a case that
contemplated the intersection of several constitutional rights—
namely, the due process requirement that a criminal defendant be
competent to stand trial, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel and the corresponding right to proceed pro se.10 This note
will expand upon these broader constitutional concerns, both federally and in New York, as they relate to the more specific question regarding mental competency presented in Stone. Part II will outline
the relevant facts and court discussion in Stone. Part III will provide
a constitutional framework by defining the rights to counsel and selfrepresentation generally. The competency limitations imposed on
self-representation by the federal and New York courts will be examined in Parts IV and V, respectively. Part VI will analyze the various
standards of mental competency that courts have articulated, identify
the inconsistencies, and ultimately argue that the New York approach
6
7
8
9
10

See discussion infra Part III.A.
See discussion infra Part III.B.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
6 N.E.3d 572 (N.Y. 2014).
Id. at 574-75.
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is more workable than the federal approach. Finally, Part VII will revisit People v. Stone, and Part VIII will conclude with a brief summary.
II.

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK V. ALIAS STONE

The New York Court of Appeals recently held in People v.
Stone that a trial court was not constitutionally obligated, under either
federal or New York law, to order a competency hearing sua sponte
prior to granting a criminal defendant’s request to proceed pro se,
where the trial court had no reason to question the defendant’s mental
competency.
A.

Factual and Procedural Background

Alias Stone was tried on two counts of burglary in the New
York County Supreme Court after he trespassed into secure areas of a
hotel and stole a cell phone.11 At trial, Stone indicated that he did not
trust his lawyer or the criminal justice system, so he requested to proceed pro se.12 The trial court repeatedly warned Stone that it was
unwise to proceed on his own and attempted to persuade him to continue with assigned counsel.13 Nevertheless, Stone insisted that his
“paranoia” and lack of faith in the legal system led to his firm wish to
represent himself and do “the best [he could] on his own.”14 Stone’s
appointed counsel also tried to discuss the matter with him, but ultimately even he agreed that Stone should proceed pro se since there
was no convincing him otherwise.15 Aside from this deep distrust of
the “system,” Stone otherwise appeared mentally sound.16 The court
granted Stone’s request, believing him to be intelligent despite his
lack of legal training, but directed that his original attorney remain
available as stand-by counsel.17 After a short period of selfrepresentation, Stone became “nervous” and asked stand-by counsel
to step in.18 At no point during trial did Stone or his assigned counsel
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Id. at 573.
Id.
Id.
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 573.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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raise any issue of Stone’s mental capacity.19
Stone was convicted at trial of two counts of burglary.20 Two
months after trial, defense counsel hired a social worker to evaluate
Stone “for sentencing purposes.”21 After concluding her evaluation,
the social worker advised the court that Stone may have undiagnosed
mental problems.22 The prosecution then informed the court that
Stone’s family had also noticed he had developed mental issues.23
The court ordered an examination pursuant to New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 730.30,24 which requires mental examination
of a defendant where the court believes he may be incapacitated and
unable to comprehend the proceedings against him.25 The psychiatric
evaluations confirmed that Stone had developed mental health issues,
including hallucinations, delusions, and possible psychotic or depressive disorder.26 In January 2010, the hearing court found Stone unfit
to proceed with sentencing.27 Stone thereafter underwent medical
treatment, and in April 2010, the trial court found that he had “recovered his competency” and could be sentenced.28
Stone appeared for his sentencing in May 2010.29 The prosecution listed his extensive history of theft offenses, while defense
counsel focused on Stone’s abusive childhood and stressed that his
previous offenses were nonviolent.30 Stone then gave a personal
statement where he spoke out against the criminal justice system, described his lifetime of imprisonment, and asserted that he “never received help transitioning to civilian life.”31 Ultimately, the court sentenced Stone to seven years in prison with five years post-release
19

Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574, 577.
Id. at 573.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 573-74.
24
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574.
25
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(1) (McKinney 2011) (“At any time after a defendant is
arraigned upon an accusatory instrument other than a felony complaint and before the imposition of sentence, or at any time after a defendant is arraigned upon a felony complaint and
before he is held for the action of the grand jury, the court wherein the criminal action is
pending must issue an order of examination when it is of the opinion that the defendant may
be an incapacitated person.”); see also discussion infra Part V.B.1.
26
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574.
20
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supervision with the terms to run concurrently.32
Stone appealed his conviction to the First Department of the
New York State Supreme Court’s Appellate Division, alleging that
the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when it
failed to examine his mental capacity before allowing him to represent himself.33 Stone urged that numerous “red flags” arose before,
during, and after trial, all of which should have alerted the court to
his lack of competency.34 Additionally, Stone argued that the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Indiana v. Edwards35 established a minimum competency standard to stand trial and a heightened standard to
represent oneself, so the trial court should have ordered a hearing to
examine Stone’s capacity to proceed pro se.36 The First Department
rejected Stone’s argument and affirmed the trial court decision.37
Stone appealed to the New York Court of Appeals.38
B.

Court of Appeals Discussion of Stone

Affirming the First Department’s decision, the Court of Appeals led its discussion by noting the implication in Stone of two constitutional imperatives: (1) the due process requirement that a defendant be competent to stand trial before proceeding39 and (2) the Sixth
Amendment right to self-representation, coupled with the “corresponding” right to competent counsel.40 New York’s standard for
competency to stand trial has been codified in Criminal Procedure
Law section 730.10(1),41 which is consistent with the federal standard
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States.42

32

Id.
Id.
34
See id. at 577.
35
554 U.S. 164 (2008).
36
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 574-75.
40
Id. at 575.
41
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.10(1) (McKinney 2011) (“ ‘Incapacitated person’ means a
defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his own defense.”).
42
362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (“[T]he test must be whether he has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”) (internal
quotations omitted).
33
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Both require that the defendant be able to understand the proceedings
against him and assist in his own defense.43 In New York, the State
must prove the defendant’s competency according to the statutory
standard only where there is some indication that his mental capacity
is questionable; otherwise, the defendant is presumed to be competent.44 Likewise, a pro se application in New York should be granted
only if the defendant “effectuates a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel.”45 The trial court must make a
“searching inquiry” into the defendant’s understanding of his decision to refuse counsel.46
The Court of Appeals then discussed two cases in depth before distinguishing both from the case at bar: Indiana v. Edwards and
People v. Reason,47 decided by the U.S. Supreme Court and the New
York Court of Appeals, respectively. In Edwards, the trial court conducted several competency hearings before finding that the defendant, a delusional schizophrenic, was competent to stand trial, yet his
mental illness rendered him incompetent to proceed pro se.48 The
Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that states are constitutionally permitted to find a mentally ill defendant competent to stand trial but incompetent to represent himself.49 The Court reasoned that since mental illness can vary in degree, in manner, and over time, a defendant’s
competence to make decisions and carry out different tasks may
likewise vary.50 In Stone, the Court of Appeals rejected Stone’s assertion that Edwards established a baseline competency standard for
a defendant to stand trial and a heightened standard to proceed pro
se.51 The court further disagreed with Stone’s interpretation of Edwards that a competency hearing is always required before a defendant can represent himself.52 In support of both of these rulings, the
Court of Appeals emphasized how Edwards merely established that a
trial court may constitutionally deny a defendant the right to selfrepresentation based on mental illness and lack of competency; this
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

See supra notes 41, 42.
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575.
Id. at 575.
Id.
334 N.E.2d 572 (N.Y. 1975).
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id.
Id.
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holding from Edwards does not, however, compel a trial court to do
so.53
The Court of Appeals then cited its decision in People v. Reason,54 where it likewise recognized that a mentally ill defendant may
possess varying capacities to complete different tasks. The trial court
in Reason had ordered an examination of the defendant’s competency
to stand trial prior to granting his pro se request. 55 When the defendant insisted that he should have received a hearing on his competency
to proceed pro se, in addition to the hearing on his competency to
stand trial, the Court of Appeals refused to draw a bright line between
levels of mental capacity with respect to these two issues.56 Mental
capacity is merely a factor to be considered in determining a valid
waiver of the right to counsel; there is “[no] distinct competency inquiry.”57 Unless there is reason to question the defendant’s mental
capacity, a formal hearing is not a precondition for a court’s adjudication of a pro se request.58
The Court of Appeals construed the Stone case as “significantly different” from both Edwards and Reason.59 In the latter two
cases, the trial court was on notice of the defendant’s mental illness
both before and during trial, in turn leading to the competency hearings; in Stone, by contrast, the defendant’s mental issues did not arise
until after the completion of trial, and the court otherwise had “no
reason to question his mental health” at the time of his pro se request.60 The court rejected Stone’s examples of noticeable mental instability—namely, his distrust of the legal system, his “paranoia” and
dissatisfaction with his attorney, as well as his occasional “obstreperous conduct” and “emotional outbursts.”61 This behavior is not uncommon among criminal defendants and was not substantial enough
to suggest mental illness and require a formal competency evaluation.62

53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576.
334 N.E.2d at 573.
Id.
Id. at 574.
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576 (internal quotations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 577.
Id.
Id.
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 577-78.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2015

7

Touro Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 4 [2015], Art. 14

900
III.

TOURO LAW REVIEW

Vol. 31

CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK: DEFINING THE RIGHTS TO
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND SELF-REPRESENTATION

The following section will broadly outline the rights to assistance of counsel and self-representation before considering the limitations courts have placed on the latter in an effort to preserve the integrity of the former. As a fundamental right expressly provided for
in the Bill of Rights, the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of
counsel has been recognized since its inception as a necessary component of due process and a fair trial.63 Thus, when the Supreme
Court established the implied Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation nearly 200 years later in Faretta v. California,64 the
dissenting Justices expressed concern as to how this right would be
fairly applied without compromising the right to counsel.65 It is important to understand the interests underlying these countervailing
rights in order to appreciate the consequential limitations that courts
have placed on self-representation.
A.

The Right to Assistance of Counsel

The Sixth Amendment explicitly confers upon United States
citizens the right to “have the Assistance of Counsel for [their] de-

63

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938) (describing the right to counsel as “necessary to insure fundamental human rights of life and liberty”); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
45, 52, 67-69 (1932) (characterizing the right to counsel as a “necessary incident of a fair
trial,” as well as a “fundamental principle[] of liberty and justice which lie[s] at the base of
all our civil and political institutions,” and expounding that a refusal of the right to counsel
would amount to “a denial of . . . due process in the constitutional sense”).
64
Although the Supreme Court in Faretta insisted that the right to self-representation has
been “protected by statute since the beginnings of our Nation,” 422 U.S. at 812, both dissenting Justices argued that despite this statutory history, the Framers’ omission of the right in
the Sixth Amendment is evidence that it was not intended as a constitutional right, id. at 844
(Burger, J., dissenting); id. at 850 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Thus, Faretta was the first Supreme Court case to unambiguously declare self-representation as a constitutional right.
65
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 840 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“[B]oth the spirit and the logic of the
Sixth Amendment are that every person accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible
defense; in the vast majority of cases this command can be honored only by means of the
expressly guaranteed right to counsel . . .”; and “there is nothing desirable or useful in permitting every accused person, even the most uneducated and inexperienced, to insist upon
conducting his own defense to criminal charges.”); id. at 849, 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(finding no basis for the right to self-representation in the Sixth Amendment, viewing the
right as one that ignores “the established principle” that the State’s interest in a criminal
prosecution is not to win but to serve justice and determine the ultimate truth, and expressing
concern with the procedural problems that will result from this right).
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fence [in criminal prosecutions].”66 The Supreme Court has emphasized the vulnerability of an unrepresented defendant, who—
regardless of his intelligence—lacks knowledge of the intricacies of
the law, familiarity with the rules of evidence, and the skills required
to prepare his own defense.67 To ensure that a defendant’s ignorance
does not result in an unfair conviction, he is entitled to representation
by an attorney whose legal training should provide him with the best
defense possible.68 It would be an undue deprivation not only of his
rights to due process and a fair trial, but also his basic human rights,
to allow a defendant to proceed to trial without proper representation.69 The right to counsel is so essential that it has been deemed
applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause.70 Notwithstanding its obligation to comport with the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, New York State also provides its defendants with the right to counsel: “In any trial in
any court whatever the party accused shall be allowed to appear and
defend in person and with counsel . . . .”71 Like the Supreme Court,
New York courts have expressed similar sentiments about the fundamental nature of this right in light of a defendant’s inherent inability to provide a strong defense without experienced counsel.72
B.

The Right to Self-Representation

The Supreme Court declared in Faretta v. California that
along with a defendant’s right to counsel exists a converse constitutional right to refuse counsel and proceed pro se.73 In Faretta, the defendant was criminally convicted after the trial court denied his application to proceed pro se, reasoning that he had no constitutional

66

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 462-63, 465; Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
68
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 465; Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69; see also supra note 65.
69
See supra note 63.
70
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1963); Powell, 287 U.S. at 67.
71
N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
72
See People v. Rosen, 613 N.E.2d 946, 949 (N.Y. 1993) (“A defendant lacking legal
training and courtroom experience may be at a decided disadvantage in carrying out the
complex task of presenting a defense.”); People v. McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d 322, 325 (N.Y.
1974) (acknowledging the strong societal interest that criminal trials determine the “truth or
falsity of the charges in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness,” which is unlikely to
occur if a defendant represents himself).
73
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807.
67
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right to self-representation.74 The Supreme Court disagreed,75 engaging in an extensive discussion about the historical bases, in both
statutory and case law, that necessarily imply a Sixth Amendment
right to self-representation.76 Because the Sixth Amendment “personally” and “directly” grants defendants various rights to assist in
their own defense, it follows that they are also entitled to conduct
their own defense pro se, should they choose to do so.77 The purpose
of the Sixth Amendment is to provide defendants with the tools to defend themselves, and “[t]o thrust counsel upon the accused, against
his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.”78
Additionally, early American and English legal history both show
that self-representation was once not only customary, but it was the
default form of representation.79
The Supreme Court also cited its own precedent in support of
its holding in Faretta. Both Snyder v. Massachusetts80 and Price v.
Johnston81 had previously contemplated, in dicta, the possibility of a
defendant conducting his own defense.82 Further, in Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann,83 the Court held that a defendant may exercise
his “free and intelligent choice” to waive his constitutional right to
counsel; hence, “the Constitution does not force a lawyer upon a defendant.”84 Though this declaration from Adams proved helpful to
the Faretta analysis, the Supreme Court noted that a different issue
was presented in Faretta—specifically, “[w]hether the Constitution
forbids a State from forcing a lawyer upon a defendant.” 85 In other
words, it was already well-established that a defendant may choose to
proceed without counsel, assuming that the trial court has no qualms
74

Id. at 810-11.
Id. at 836.
76
Id. at 817.
77
Id. at 819-20.
78
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 820.
79
Id. at 823.
80
291 U.S. 97 (1934), overruled in part on other grounds by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1
(1964).
81
334 U.S. 266 (1948), abrogated on other grounds by McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467
(1991).
82
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 816.
83
317 U.S. 269 (1942).
84
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 814-15 (quoting Adams, 317 U.S. at 279). The Supreme Court in
Adams also noted that “a shrewd and experienced layman may, for his own sufficient reasons, conduct his own defense if he prefers to do so.” Adams, 317 U.S. at 278.
85
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 815.
75
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with this choice. What was unsettled until Faretta, however, was
whether a trial court could force a defendant to accept counsel against
his will. The majority in Faretta answered this question in the negative.86
The Faretta Court emphasized the importance of a defendant’s autonomy and freedom to make his own choices, even if they
result in “his own detriment.”87 The Court acknowledged that there
are credible arguments against recognizing a right to selfrepresentation, such as the value of a lawyer’s role in assuring a fair
trial for a criminal defendant.88 However, “it is one thing to hold that
every defendant, rich or poor, has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite another to say that a State may compel a defendant to
accept a lawyer he does not want.”89 As important as the right to
counsel may be, free choice is likewise an invaluable, fundamental
right.90 In most cases, a defendant is obviously better off with counsel; yet, if the defendant is unwilling to accept his counsel’s assistance, “the potential advantage of a lawyer’s training and experience
can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly.”91 Furthermore, it is not
“inconceivable” that a defendant may present a better defense than
would his counsel.92 In sum, the Court came to a “nearly universal
conviction” that, assuming a defendant validly waives his right to
counsel, “forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is contrary to
his basic right to defend himself . . . .”93
While federal law identifies self-representation as an implied
right, the New York Constitution expressly confers this right on its
citizens: “In any trial in any court whatever the party accused shall be
allowed to appear and defend in person and with counsel . . . .”94
Likewise, three separate sections of the New York Criminal Procedure Law provide that if a defendant seeks to proceed without counsel, “the court must permit him to do so [if] it is satisfied that he
made such decision with knowledge of the significance thereof . . .

86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 807.
Id. at 834.
Id. at 832-33.
Id. at 833.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 833-34.
Id. at 834.
Id.
Id. at 817.
N.Y. CONST. art. I. § 6 (emphasis added).
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.”95 New York case law has upheld this right, but it has also revealed
that, much like federal law, the boundaries of self-representation
“remain largely undefined.”96 These unclear boundaries are a result
of New York’s difficulty in balancing what it recognizes as two
equally important but competing interests: a defendant’s autonomy to
make free choices versus his fair trial right to an effective defense.97
IV.

FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION

The federal right to self-representation is not absolute.98
Though a defendant’s autonomy and volition deserve great respect,
the competing interest of his fair trial right to an effective defense requires certain conditions to be met before allowing a defendant to
represent himself.99 First, the defendant must be competent to stand
trial.100 Of course, if a defendant lacks the mental capacity to stand
trial, then his inability to stand trial will render his self-representation
a non-issue; nonetheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that this is
95
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.10(6) (McKinney 2007); Id. at § 180.10(5); Id. at §
210.15(5).
96
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326.
97
See Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 575 (characterizing the rights to counsel and self-representation
as “corresponding—and sometimes competing” interests); People v. Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d
1154, 1155-56 (N.Y. 2002) (describing the right to counsel and the right to forego counsel as
“inherently antagonistic ideals,” so in order to best serve the interests of justice and fundamental fairness, the right to self-representation must be qualified); Rosen, 613 N.E.2d at 949
(noting that the right to self-representation exists partly “to affirm the dignity and autonomy
of the accused,” but also acknowledging that a defendant who is legally inexperienced may
be disadvantaged “in carrying out the complex task of presenting a defense”); McIntyre, 324
N.E.2d at 325 (emphasizing an individual’s right to “determine his own destiny,” which is
embodied in the right to self-representation, as well as the “countervailing interest of society” that the criminal justice system is supposed to determine the “truth or falsity of the
charges in a manner consistent with fundamental fairness”).
98
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 171.
99
Because this note focuses on the self-representation limitations related to mental competency, other limitations on the exercise of the right are not relevant to this discussion;
however, for the sake of comprehensiveness, they will be briefly addressed. In a footnote,
the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California remarked that a state may (1) terminate the right
to self-representation of a defendant who “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
misconduct” and (2) insist upon “standby counsel” to assist and be available if the defendant
needs help or forfeits his self-representation right. 422 U.S. at 834 n.46. Some other restrictions may include a timely request to proceed pro se, as well as a clear and unequivocal
communication of the request. Tiffany Frigenti, Note, Flying Solo Without a License: The
Right of Pro Se Defendants to Crash and Burn – People v. Smith, 28 TOURO L. REV. 1019,
1032-33 (2013).
100
See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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a prerequisite to exercising the right to self-representation.101 Second, the court must find that the defendant waived his right to counsel competently, knowingly, and voluntarily.102 Third, the defendant
must also be competent to conduct his own defense, as distinguished
from his competence to choose self-representation.103 The Supreme
Court has attempted to define the levels of competency a defendant
must exhibit to satisfy each of these requirements; however, the nuances between the standards are difficult to discern, and courts struggle to apply them appropriately without compromising the integrity
of the constitutional rights they are intended to protect.
A.

Competency to Stand Trial

This subsection will summarize federal case law governing
competency to stand trial, which must be established both to effect a
valid waiver of counsel and to exercise the right to selfrepresentation,104 and which has been used by the Supreme Court as a
starting point in articulating other related standards of competency.105
Due process requires that criminal defendants be mentally
competent to stand trial before they can be prosecuted without offending the Constitution.106 In a short, two-paragraph opinion, the
Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States107 created a two-part test
that established the minimum standard of competency required by the
Constitution. First, the defendant must have “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding.”108 Second, the defendant must have a “rational as well
as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”109
101

See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
103
See discussion infra Part IV.C.
104
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 409 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Today, the
majority holds that [the] standard of competence [to stand trial] is constitutionally adequate
to assess a defendant’s competence to waive the right to counsel and represent himself.”);
see also id. at 400 (majority opinion). The Godinez majority explained that a defendant must
be competent to stand trial before he can waive his right to counsel. Id. Since waiver of the
right to counsel is a prerequisite to self-representation, it follows that competency to stand
trial must also be satisfied before a defendant can exercise his right to represent himself.
105
See discussion infra Parts IV.B, IV.C.
106
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378
(1966).
107
362 U.S. 402 (1960).
108
Id. at 402.
109
Id.
102
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have elaborated on this
test by articulating factors to consider for satisfying the Dusky competence standard. In Pate v. Robinson,110 the Court suggested that
trial courts look into the defendant’s (1) “history of pronounced irrational behavior,” (2) “demeanor at trial,” and (3) prior psychiatric history, if any.111 None of these factors is dispositive.112 Drope v. Missouri113 examined the same three competency factors even further,
explaining that trial courts should evaluate the factors collectively
since there are “no fixed or immutable signs” that will necessarily indicate competence.114 Furthermore, competence is an ever-changing
state, so courts should “be alert” to indications of change in a defendant’s mental capabilities.115
B.

Waiver of the Right to Assistance of Counsel

A valid waiver of the right to counsel is another prerequisite
to a defendant being permitted to represent himself.116 Much like the
rationale behind the right to self-representation, a defendant’s right to
refuse counsel is an extension of his individual liberty to make free
choices.117 By definition, a waiver is an “intentional relinquishment
or abandonment of a known right or privilege.”118 Thus, a waiver
will not be valid unless it is provided competently, knowingly, and
voluntarily.119 The Supreme Court in Godinez v. Moran120 characterized this as a two-part inquiry, where (1) the competence inquiry focuses on whether the defendant has the mental capacity and “ability
to understand the proceedings,” and (2) the knowing and voluntary
inquiry questions whether the defendant “actually does understand
the significance and consequences of a particular decision,” and
whether the decision is made willingly and is “uncoerced.”121 The
110

383 U.S. 375 (1966).
Id. at 386.
112
Id.; Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
113
420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
114
Id. at 180.
115
Id. at 181.
116
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
117
Adams, 317 U.S. at 275.
118
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
119
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401-02; Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Adams, 317 U.S. at 275, 279; Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464, 468.
120
509 U.S. 389 (1993).
121
Id. at 401 n.12 (emphases in original).
111
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defendant need not have “the skill and experience of a lawyer” in order to waive the right to counsel knowingly and intelligently,122 but
he should be informed of, and be able to appreciate, the risks and
consequences involved.123 Trial courts should engage in a factspecific analysis in each case by investigating areas such as the defendant’s “background, experience, and conduct.”124 Courts must
“indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver” of the right to
counsel and be certain that a defendant has provided a valid waiver
before depriving him of this constitutional right.125
The Court in Godinez determined that the standard of competence for waiver of counsel is no higher than the standard of competence to stand trial, stressing the distinction between the competence
to waive the right to counsel versus the competence to actually proceed without counsel and conduct one’s own trial defense.126 It is
therefore sufficient, where the defendant seeks to waive his right to
counsel, that he satisfy the same competency standard articulated in
Dusky.127 By contrast, the standard of competency to proceed pro se
may be higher than the Dusky standard, as discussed below.
C.

COMPETENCY TO PROCEED PRO SE

Separate and distinct from the self-representation prerequisite
that a defendant provide a competent waiver of the right to counsel is
the additional requirement that he be competent to conduct his own
defense. In Indiana v. Edwards, the Supreme Court held that a trial
court can constitutionally deny a defendant’s self-representation request based on a finding that, while he may satisfy the minimum level of competency to stand trial as articulated in Dusky, he may nevertheless fall into a “gray area” of mental competency where he is
unable to conduct his own defense due to mental illness.128 The defendant in Edwards had a history of mental problems, including delusions and schizophrenia, so the court subjected him to several competency hearings before deeming him fit to stand trial.129 The trial court
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
Id.; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 514, 516 (1962); Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 399.
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173-76.
Id. at 167-69.
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refused his subsequent pro se request, observing that although he was
competent to stand trial, his mental illness limited his ability to conduct his own defense.130 After he was convicted, the defendant appealed, asserting a violation of his constitutional right to selfrepresentation.131 The matter reached the Indiana Supreme Court,
which held that the State was required to allow the defendant to proceed pro se, but then asked the U.S. Supreme Court to consider the
issue.132
The U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards noted that its opinion in
Godinez was a helpful starting point, but it did not resolve the issue at
hand.133 In Godinez, the defendant sought to waive his right to counsel, proceed on his own, and merely enter a guilty plea; in Edwards,
on the other hand, the defendant sought to waive his right to counsel,
proceed on his own, and conduct his own trial proceedings. 134 Thus,
the issue in Godinez was the defendant’s competence to waive the
right to counsel, whereas the issue in Edwards was his competence to
conduct his own defense.135 Also, in Godinez, the Supreme Court
merely held that a State may “permit a gray-area defendant to represent himself,” while the issue in Edwards was whether a State may
“deny a gray-area defendant the right to represent himself.”136
In reaching its conclusion, the Edwards Court emphasized
how mental illness can vary in degree over time and manifest itself in
different ways.137 As a result, while a defendant’s mental abilities
may allow him to minimally appreciate the proceedings and constitutionally be subjected to trial, he may fall into a “gray area” where his
mental abilities do not allow him to “carry out the basic tasks” necessary to conduct his own trial defense.138 Moreover, the purposes of
promoting a defendant’s “dignity” and “autonomy,” which underlie
the right to self-representation, are not served in cases where the defendant is not mentally capable of conducting his own defense.139
The Court concluded that trial courts must be able to take into ac130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139

Id. at 169.
Id.
Id.
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 172-73.
Id. at 173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 175-76.
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 175-76.
Id. at 176.
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count the varying degrees of mental capacity that a defendant may
exhibit and use their best judgment to determine whether the defendant can stand trial, proceed pro se, or both.140
V.

NEW YORK LIMITATIONS ON THE RIGHT TO SELFREPRESENTATION

The following section will describe the limitations on selfrepresentation in New York and identify the major differences between federal and New York law.141 According to U.S. Supreme
Court precedent, a defendant seeking to proceed pro se must first
demonstrate (1) competency to stand trial, (2) competency to waive
the right to counsel, as well as a knowing and voluntary waiver, and
(3) competency to proceed pro se.142 By contrast, New York only
partially recognizes the foregoing conditions on self-representation—
specifically, competency to stand trial and a knowing and voluntary
waiver. New York does not separately consider competency to waive
counsel or competency to proceed pro se; rather, trial courts have discretion to consider a defendant’s overall mental capability as a factor
in determining a valid waiver of the right to counsel.
A.

The McIntyre Test

The New York Court of Appeals first articulated the limits on
the state’s explicit constitutional right to self-representation in People
v. McIntyre.143 In McIntyre, the trial court denied the defendant’s pro
se application after he made a rude outburst during the court’s general inquiry.144 The Court of Appeals reversed his conviction, finding
the outburst insufficient to warrant refusal of the right to selfrepresentation, but also acknowledging that until McIntyre there had
140

Id. at 177-78.
See supra note 99 and accompanying text. Similarly, the discussion of selfrepresentation restrictions in New York will be limited to those that involve mental competency. New York also recognizes the limitations discussed in note 99, as seen in the McIntyre test (infra Part V.A), but they do not warrant further analysis in the context of this note.
142
See discussion supra Part IV.
143
324 N.E.2d 322 (N.Y. 1974).
144
At one point during the court’s questioning of the defendant, the defendant yelled “
‘F*** the jury. I’m not going to trial.’ (Whereupon the defendant jumped up, knocked the
chair over.).” Id. at 325. The court thereafter denied the defendant’s pro se request based on
this outburst, the court’s conversation with him, and the defendant’s previous assertion that
he believed assigned counsel to be perfectly competent. Id.
141
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been no clearly defined boundaries surrounding the right.145 In its
discussion, the Court of Appeals described the competing interests
involved in the right to self-representation: on the one hand is the cultural ideal that a person has the right to “determine his own destiny,”
and on the other hand is the countervailing, “yet equally powerful
ideal” that the courts should ensure a fair trial that determines the actual truth of criminal charges.146 In light of these concerns, the Court
of Appeals stressed its reluctance to allow the continued existence of
the right to self-representation without reasonable limitations.147
Consequently, the Court of Appeals created a three-pronged
test for determining whether a criminal defendant may invoke his
right to represent himself. First, the pro se request must be “unequivocal and timely asserted.”148 To be unequivocal, the request must be
made “clearly and unconditionally,”149 and to be timely, the request
must be asserted before the start of trial absent “compelling circumstances.”150 Second, the defendant must knowingly and intelligently
waive his right to counsel.151 In determining whether a waiver is effective, courts should consider the defendant’s personal background,
such as “age, education, occupation and previous exposure to legal
procedures,” but ignorance of the law is not alone sufficient to deprive a defendant of his right to self-representation.152 Third, the defendant cannot have “engaged in conduct which would prevent the
fair and orderly exposition of the issues.”153 A defendant’s right to
self-representation is thus forfeited if he engages in disruptive conduct intended to undermine or delay the proceedings.154 Although
not articulated in McIntyre, the Court of Appeals has identified a
fourth prerequisite to self-representation that the defendant be competent to stand trial.155 Competency to stand trial is a rebuttable presumption, however, so the burden to make an inquiry arises only if
145

McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 326, 328.
Id. at 325.
147
Id. at 326.
148
Id. at 327.
149
Id.
150
McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 327-28
155
Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574 (“[T]he right of a defendant to act as his own attorney . . .
can only be premised on a prior determination that he has mental capacity to stand trial.”).
146
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there is reason to question it.156
B.

Competency, Waiver, and “Searching Inquiry”

New York’s inquiry into valid waiver of counsel differs from
the U.S. Supreme Court’s inquiry. In Godinez, the Supreme Court
created a two-part inquiry into waiver: first, the defendant must be
competent to waive his right to counsel, and second, the decision
must be made knowingly and voluntarily.157 In New York, however,
the sole inquiry is whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary; the
defendant’s competency, or “mental capability,”158 in this context is
just one of several factors that may be considered.159 Similarly, New
York does not require a separate inquiry into competency to proceed
pro se, as federal law does. Despite New York’s lack of distinct
competency inquiries into waiver of the right to counsel or proceeding pro se, competency to stand trial is a distinct prerequisite to the
exercise of self-representation, as discussed further below.
1.

Competency to Stand Trial

In New York, competency to stand trial, or “capacity,” is defined by statute, and a reasonable belief of incapacity compels judicial action; otherwise, sufficient capacity is presumed. Under New
York Criminal Procedure Law section 730.30(1), if a court is “of the
opinion that the [criminal] defendant is an incapacitated person,” then

156

See discussion infra Part V.B.1.
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 401 n.12.
158
Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574. The language employed by the Court of Appeals is not
always consistent, but it appears that “capacity” tends to refer to the statutory term defined in
New York Criminal Procedure Law section 730.10, and it equates to the federal standard for
“competency to stand trial.” The term “competency” in New York case law is often used
interchangeably with “capacity,” but can probably be defined more broadly as “mental capability,” whereas “capacity” is used more frequently in the specific context of ability to stand
trial. See, e.g., Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 574-76 (mentioning the federal due process requirement
that a defendant be “competent to stand trial,” and referring to the same standard in New
York as “mental capacity,” but also using the term “capacity” to describe a defendant’s
“ability” to effect a knowing and voluntary waiver); People v. Mendez, 801 N.E.2d 382, 384
(N.Y. 2003) (referring to the statutory definition of “incapacitated person” as a “test for
competence [to stand trial]”); Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574 (discussing broadly the “standard[s] of competency” for standing trial and acting pro se, refusing to distinguish between
“levels of mental capacity,” and noting that “mental capability” should be considered in determining a valid waiver).
159
Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
157
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it “must issue an order of examination.”160 An “incapacitated person”
is defined as a “defendant who as a result of mental disease or defect
lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against him or to assist
in his own defense[,]”161 and an “order of examination” is an “order .
. . directing that [a criminal defendant] be examined for the purpose
of determining if he is an incapacitated person.”162 Thus, a New
York court has the statutory obligation to examine a defendant’s
competency only if it has reason to believe that he is unable to comprehend the matters involved.163 A defendant is presumed to be competent, and a mere history of mental illness is not enough to rebut that
presumption.164 The decision to order such an examination “lies
within the sound discretion of the trial court.”165 If, pursuant to an
examination order, the psychiatric examiners come to a unanimous
opinion regarding the defendant’s capacity, then the trial court may
conduct a hearing sua sponte on the issue of capacity, but it must
conduct a hearing upon request of the defendant or prosecutor. 166 If,
however, the examiners are not unanimous in their opinion, then the
court must conduct a capacity hearing sua sponte.167 This statutory
definition for “capacity” serves as the New York State equivalent of
the U.S. Supreme Court’s “competency to stand trial” standard provided in Dusky.
2.

Waiver and “Searching Inquiry”

The Court of Appeals has further established that trial courts
must conduct a “searching inquiry” into the second prong of the
McIntyre test (valid waiver of the right to counsel), or else the waiver
will be “deemed ineffective.”168 This requirement was first articulated in People v. Reason, when the Court of Appeals considered
160

N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(1) (McKinney 2011).
Id. at § 730.10(1).
162
Id. at § 730.10(2).
163
People v. Morgan, 662 N.E.2d 260, 261 (N.Y. 1995).
164
People v. Gelikkaya, 643 N.E.2d 517, 519 (N.Y. 1994); see also People v. Tafari, 891
N.Y.S.2d 711, 713 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2009) (reversing the trial court’s denial of selfrepresentation right, which was based solely upon defendant’s mental illness and court’s belief that defendant’s medication “affected [his] ability to understand the proceedings”).
165
Morgan, 662 N.E.2d at 261.
166
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 730.30(2) & (3) (McKinney 2011).
167
Id. at § 730.30(4).
168
People v. Smith, 705 N.E.2d 1205, 1207-08 (N.Y. 1998); see also People v. Sawyer,
438 N.E.2d 1133, 1138 (N.Y. 1982); Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575.
161
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whether a trial court must order an examination of a defendant’s
competency to waive his right to counsel and defend himself if the
court has already examined the defendant’s competency to stand trial.169 The Reason court prefaced its discussion by “reject[ing] the
[defendant’s] contention that there are two separate and distinct levels of mental capacity—one to stand trial, another to waive the right
to be represented by counsel and to act as one’s own attorney.”170
The court explained that the standard for competency to stand trial
originated at a time when self-representation was commonplace; it
would thus be foolish to suggest that a standard “designed to determine whether a defendant was capable of defending himself, is inadequate when he chooses to conduct his own defense.”171 Further, application of a heightened standard would likely infringe on the
constitutional right to self-representation.172
While the Reason court declined to draw a bright line between
levels of capacity, it insisted that a defendant’s mental capability is
still important when considering the validity of a waiver.173 Unlike
federal law—which requires a two-part inquiry into the validity of a
waiver, when mental competency is evaluated independently from
the knowing/voluntary inquiry174—New York courts merely consider
mental competency as a factor in assessing the sole inquiry of whether the waiver was knowing/voluntary and thus legally valid.175 The
record in Reason showed that the trial court had conducted an exami169
In Reason, the defendant was charged and indicted for murder and attempted murder
for stabbing two men. 334 N.E.2d at 573. After his arraignment, the court ordered an examination of the defendant’s capacity to stand trial, and he was found competent to proceed. Id.
The defendant requested to proceed pro se prior to his trial, and he resisted the court’s strong
urges to allow counsel to represent him. Id. The court allowed him to represent himself, and
the trial concluded with a conviction. Id. Although the defendant exhibited unusual behavior during trial, such as “drift[ing] into irrelevant and nearly incoherent discourses,” he firmly insisted that he was not mentally incapacitated and refused to present an insanity defense.
Id. Following his trial, the court ordered another examination of the defendant’s mental capacity to proceed with sentencing. Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 573. The examining psychiatrists
determined, and the court agreed, that the defendant understood the proceedings against him
and could assist in his own defense. Id. On appeal, since the defendant had denied the issue
of mental incapacity, he argued that he was denied his constitutional right to counsel because
he was not sufficiently competent to represent himself. Id. The Appellate Division affirmed
the conviction, and the defendant appealed further to the Court of Appeals. Id.
170
Id. at 574.
171
Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
172
Id.
173
Id.
174
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 400, 401 n.12.
175
Stone, 6 N.E.3d at 576; Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 574.
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nation of the defendant’s competence to stand trial, repeatedly discussed with the defendant the dangers involved with selfrepresentation, and ultimately determined from these interactions that
he had waived his right “knowingly and intelligently with full awareness of the risks and consequences.”176 The Court of Appeals believed that the trial court, having considered the defendant’s mental
competency and whether he understood the dangers involved, made a
sufficient searching inquiry into the McIntyre prong requiring a
knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to counsel; a separate
mental examination was not necessary.177
Just as the Supreme Court requires when ensuring a valid
waiver of counsel,178 New York’s searching inquiry of a defendant
must ensure that he understands his rights and warns him of the risks
and dangers of proceeding pro se.179 In reaching this goal, a trial
court should engage in a discussion with the defendant about his
“age, education, occupation, previous exposure to legal procedures
and other relevant factors bearing on a competent, intelligent, voluntary waiver.”180 This list of factors is not all-inclusive; the Court of
Appeals has “eschewed application of any rigid formula and endorsed the use of a nonformalistic, flexible inquiry.”181 A waiver of
the right to counsel will not be deemed ineffective simply for failing
to question the defendant about each and every one of these factors.182 Still, the trial court’s dialogue with the defendant should adequately warn him of the inherent perils of self-representation, as well
as the “singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of
adjudication,” to ensure he is making an informed decision.183 An
inquiry is not sufficiently “searching” where the court merely (1) repeatedly insists that the defendant continue with assigned counsel;184
176

Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575.
Id. at 575-76.
178
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835 (“[A defendant] should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation.”); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional
rights [must be] done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”).
179
Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156; People v. Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1991);
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208; Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d at 1138; Reason, 334 N.E.2d at 575.
180
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208; see also McIntyre, 324 N.E.2d at 327.
181
People v. Providence, 813 N.E.2d 632, 635 (N.Y. 2004); Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156;
see also Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208.
182
Providence, 813 N.E.2d at 635.
183
Smith, 705 N.E.2d at 1208.
184
Id.
177
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(2) informs the defendant that it is not in his best interest to proceed
without counsel;185 (3) reassures the defendant that he will have
standby counsel as an advisor;186 (4) leaves the defendant with no
choice but to represent himself after refusing to cooperate with or accept assigned counsel;187 or (5) assumes a valid waiver based on the
defendant’s apparent sensibility.188
VI.

“HAUNTED TRIALS”189—INCONSISTENT STANDARDS OF
COMPETENCY

In a broad sense, the competency limitations on the right to
self-representation in New York are not entirely dissimilar to those
imposed by the U.S. Supreme Court. Both New York and federal
courts recognize the important but competing rights to assistance of
counsel versus self-representation, as well as their respective interests
in securing a fair defense versus encouraging individual autonomy.
Both have delineated reasonable restrictions on the right to selfrepresentation in an effort to keep it in harmony with the right to
counsel. Furthermore, both have emphasized the basic due process
requirements that a defendant be competent to stand trial and that he
effect a valid waiver before disposing of a constitutional right.
Where New York and federal courts diverge, however, is in their application of the competency requirements and articulation of standards for them.
The U.S. Supreme Court conditions the exercise of selfrepresentation, in part, on the defendant’s competency to (1) stand
185
Sawyer, 438 N.E.2d at 1138 (describing the trial court’s inquiry as “woefully inadequate” when it refused to assign defendant new counsel upon request and informed defendant that his only alternative was to represent himself, but advised that self-representation was
not in his “best interests”).
186
Slaughter, 583 N.E.2d at 922-23 (finding inquiry insufficient where trial court informed defendant, in response to a request for new counsel, that “if he no longer wanted to
be represented by his assigned counsel, then he could represent himself,” and explained that
he would not receive assistance from the court, but his original assigned counsel would remain available as an advisor).
187
See supra notes 185-86.
188
Arroyo, 772 N.E.2d at 1156 (ruling that no valid waiver was effected where trial court
sweepingly concluded that “there was no need to ask defendant any questions to know that
he was ‘sensible to some extent’ ”).
189
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[Many of the] procedural problems spawned by [the right to self-representation], such as the standards of waiver and the
treatment of the pro se defendant, will haunt the trial of every defendant who elects to exercise his right to self-representation.”) (emphasis added).
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trial, (2) waive the right to counsel, and (3) proceed pro se. The first
two conditions can both be satisfied by the minimum competency
standard articulated in Dusky, but trial courts have the discretion to
require a heightened standard for the third condition if the defendant
is mentally ill. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not provided
much guidance for trial courts to apply these standards. It is also difficult to rationalize the distinction the Court drew in both Godinez
and Edwards between choosing to proceed pro se (i.e., waiving the
right to counsel) and proceeding pro se. As Justice Blackmun observed in his Godinez dissent:
It is obvious that a defendant who waives counsel
must represent himself. . . . And a defendant who is utterly incapable of conducting his own defense cannot
be considered “competent” to make such a decision,
any more than a person who chooses to leap out of a
window in the belief that he can fly can be considered
“competent” to make such a choice.190
Thus, the distinction between choosing to proceed pro se and proceeding pro se is an artificial one, since a defendant is unlikely to accomplish one without the other. Although the Court claimed a difference between the Edwards defendant representing himself to conduct
his own trial, and the Godinez defendant representing himself “only
to change his pleas to guilty,”191 both defendants ultimately conducted their own defenses. The Court made an unjustified and arbitrary
distinction by suggesting that different competency standards may
apply depending on the nature of the self-representation.
This distinction is particularly troublesome in light of the
Court’s arguments in Godinez and Edwards, in support of the standards for waiving counsel and proceeding pro se, respectively. In
Godinez, the Court explicitly rejected the view that waiver of the
right to counsel requires a higher level of mental functioning than
that required to stand trial. Yet the Court proffered that there may be
a different competency standard to represent oneself, as distinguished
from the standard to choose to represent oneself. Indeed, in Edwards,
the Court found that the standard of competency to represent oneself
may be higher than the standard of competency to choose selfrepresentation when the defendant is mentally ill, reasoning that men190
191

Godinez, 509 U.S. at 416 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Edwards, 554 U.S. at 173.
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tal illness can vary in degree and manifest itself in different ways.
But if these two standards may differ on this basis, then by the same
logic—and contrary to the Court’s holding in Godinez—there is no
reason that the standard for competency to stand trial cannot also differ from that required to waive counsel.
New York’s approach is far more workable. The New York
Court of Appeals has repeatedly declined to recognize differing
standards of competency to complete various trial-related tasks. It
has reasoned that while there is no need to create separate inquiries
into types of competency with different standards, mental competency is still highly relevant when determining a valid waiver. Thus, the
Supreme Court’s jump in logic—between Godinez, where it found no
reason to require different competency standards for standing trial
and waiving the right to counsel, and Edwards, where it held that
mental illness can warrant different competency standards for waiving the right to counsel and proceeding pro se—is not a concern in
New York. Likewise, by treating waiver of the right to counsel and
self-representation as cooperative and interdependent, New York
avoids the conundrum created by the Supreme Court’s refusal to do
the same. In fact, the Court of Appeals has characterized waiver of
counsel as a right that is “implicit [and] concomitant” in the right to
self-representation.192
VII.

PEOPLE V. STONE REVISITED

Consistent with its own precedent, the Court of Appeals in
People v. Stone correctly decided the issue of whether the trial court
was required to sua sponte order a competency hearing to assess
Stone’s ability to conduct his own defense. While Stone insisted that
Edwards created a new rule in self-representation cases that trial
courts must evaluate a defendant’s competency to proceed pro se, the
Court of Appeals appropriately rejected this argument on the basis
that New York has never required this as a separate and independent
inquiry. This is also consistent with federal law, since the Edwards
Court specifically held that trial courts may deny mentally ill defendants the right to self-representation, which does not mean they are required to, as Stone alleged. With respect to Stone’s alternate argument, that Edwards created a baseline competency standard to stand
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trial and a heightened standard to proceed pro se, the Court of Appeals properly rejected this distinction pursuant to New York law,
which does not recognize separate competency standards whatsoever.
Although the Court of Appeals did not acknowledge the differing approaches employed by federal and New York courts with respect to
competency standards, it did note that its view was not inconsistent
with the federal view. Again, the Edwards Court merely held that
trial courts may impose a heightened competency standard when a
mentally ill defendant seeks to represent himself, but they need not
do so. Indeed, New York has chosen not to, and this is constitutionally adequate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The constitutional right to self-representation implicates conflicting interests that must be properly balanced, so courts have responded by reasonably limiting the exercise of this right. Stemming
from the longstanding due process requirement that a defendant be
mentally competent to stand trial, the Supreme Court has additionally
required that a defendant be mentally competent to waive his right to
counsel and conduct his own defense before he can exercise his right
to self-representation. Regrettably, the federal decisions that articulated these standards of competency are often inconsistent with one
another. New York, by contrast, has prevented such confusion by refusing to create additional inquiries into mental competency beyond
competency to stand trial. Instead, New York considers a defendant’s mental capabilities when determining whether he validly
waived his right to counsel and can thus proceed on his own. Overall, New York’s approach is more logical and practical, as it avoids
so many of the variables that the Supreme Court has created.
Julia M. Capie*

*

Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2016; New York University, B.A. 2012. I would like to thank my fiancé and Touro Law alumnus, Adam Ansanelli,
who has guided me, mentored me, and supported me throughout my law school career. My
mom, Gina Carri, and my dad and s’mom, James and Jessica Capie, for their unconditional
love and moral support in every aspect of my life. My big sister, Melissa Monteforte, for
showing me what it is to be a strong, wise woman, and my little brother and best friend,
Jimmy Capie, for always keeping me laughing. My Legal Process Professor, Debbie Lanin,
for teaching me the nuanced skills of strong legal writing. Last but not least, the staff of the
Touro Law Review, especially my editor, James Lyons, and faculty advisor, Professor Ann
Nowak, for their valuable guidance throughout my writing process.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/14

26

